A Systematic Review of Digital Authentication for Blockchain- Based E-Voting Systems

Abstract

This paper reviews 40 studies on blockchain-based e-voting proposals, specifically focusing on authentication and related trade-offs. A data-based examination of the evidence showed that password-based mechanisms, although popular, detected only 85% of the attacks. In contrast, Zero- Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) have a detection rate of 99% but only a completion rate of 72% for usability, implying that security and usability are strongly inversely correlated (r=-0.67). For instance, hybrid approaches such as ZKPs with biometrics or Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) with multi- factor authentication are considered secure (96%-99%) but not very user- friendly (80%-85%). Homomorphic encryption and other technologies have been cited as privacy aids in the literature. In addition, technical design alone cannot overcome the deep-seated sociopolitical challenges of enduring digital divides and citizen mistrust, which are slow to change within large populations, or regulatory dissonance between local and national systems, as illustrated in the cases of Estonia's i-Voting and an aborted Swiss pilot. "The trade-off between security, privacy, usability, and cost is always fluid. More integrated and effective interdisciplinarity is needed to ensure that important issues for social and political life, such as democratic legitimacy, are adequately addressed in post-quantum cryptography and artificial intelligence research. Planning prophylactic measures is necessary in the context of emerging threats from quantum computing and AI-produced deepfakes. While there are alternatives to post-quantum cryptographic ciphers, these incur computational overhead. Therefore, making e-voting secure will rely not only on new technology but also on understanding the social and political effects of that technology, being aware of how it might be put into practice, and focusing on a design that meets the needs of all voters.